**1NC Framework**

**A. Interpretation – the aff should defend the implementation of a topical plan action**

**1. “Resolved” before a colon introduces a formal resolution**

**Army Officer School 04**

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

**The colon introduces** the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. **A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"** Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

**2. “The United States federal government should” means the debate is solely about hypothetical policy action**

**Ericson et al. 03**

(Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts at California Polytechnic State University, 2003, “The Debater’s Guide,” Third Edition,” p. 7, accessed via Google Books on 3-29-12 //Bosley)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions**, each topic contains certain key elements**, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions**. 1. An agent doing the acting –-“The United States” in “The United States should adopt** a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, **the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should**—the first part of a verb phrase **that urges action**. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. **For example, should adopt** here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. **Propositions of policy deal with future action.** Nothing has yet occurred. **The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur.** What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

**3. “The United States federal government” is the legislative, judicial, and executive branches**

**USA.gov 12**

(Official US. Government Web Portal, “U.S. Federal Government, last updated 3-27-12, <http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/federal.shtml>, accessed 3-29-12 //Bosley)

**U.S. Federal Government The three branches of U.S. government—legislative, judicial, and executive**—carry out governmental power and functions.

**4. “War powers authority of the President” refers to Commander in Chief power to deploy military force**

**Bejesky 2012** (Robert, M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M. International Law (Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses for Cooley Law School and the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan, American government and constitutional law courses for Alma College, and business law courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami, WAR POWERS PURSUANT TO FALSE PERCEPTIONS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN THE "ZONE OF TWILIGHT,” St. Mary's Law Journal, 44 St. Mary's L. J. 1, lexis)

V. CONCLUSION¶ **The roles of war powers delegated to Congress and the Executive within the text of the United States Constitution are quite clear** when Framer intent and historical records are considered. **Congress authorizes the use of force; the President is Commander in Chief of the United States Military when using force within the confines of Congress's authorization**. n560 Congress has authorized the use of military force in all but one major confrontation the United States has engaged in (the Korean War), which includes declaring war five times and authorizing large-scale military force four times. n561 Presidents largely adhere to the War Powers Resolution of 1973, which requires the President provide information to Congress and affirms Congress's right to authorize the use of force. n562¶ The Constitution states Congress funds, legislates over, and otherwise provides for the military and that the President is caretaker of the military during peacetime. n563 **Once Congress authorizes the President to deploy military force, Congress cannot interfere with the President's execution of orders; however, Congress has limited, conditioned, and parameterized the use of force**. n564 Presidents respected those restrictions at Jackson's lowest [\*94] ebb. Professors Barron and Lederman emphasized that there was no prior "sustained practice of [Presidents] actually disregarding statutes" until the last Bush Administration. n565¶ Due to drastic global changes since the Framers adopted the United States Constitution, it is possible for the Executive Branch and advocates of Executive powers to be immoderately risk-averse and propel presidential power. The President's informational advantages with the expansion of the administrative state and control over the national security apparatus, the reinterpretation of the use of force in the post-UN world and disparate levels of force, judicial hesitation to accept certiorari on use of force questions after the Vietnam War, and the President's advice from legal counsel are the primary variables that lead to confrontation within the zone of twilight. n566 Other considerations that should abate risk aversion since the Constitution's adoption include: today's elevated cooperation, UN restrictions on the use of force, United States hegemony, NATO as a global defense pact, and the role of the UN Security Council to prevent the use of force.¶ **Advocates should be respected for** their **creativity** **in sponsoring a dominant executive position** and so-called inherent presidential authority **in war powers** premised on originalism. n567 **However, biased advisory memos classified under national security that contain faulty premises should not be regarded as legitimate opinions** **leading to precedent that expands presidential powers**. It is toilsome to conceive that the text of the Constitution is so manipulable and that Supreme Court cases, legislation, [\*95] academics, and logic have been in discord about the scope of the Executive's war powers for nearly two centuries.

**B. Violation – the affirmative claims to win the debate for reasons other than the benefits of hypothetical implementation of a topical policy action**

**C. Vote negative**

**1. Predictable limits – there’s an infinite number of alternative frameworks outside of instrumental defense of the resolution – shifting the debate ensures one side is unprepared which destroys productive clash**

**2. Fairness – allowing the affirmative to defend vague alternative positions allows the aff to become a moving target – that makes it impossible to be neg because the aff can spike out of any links**

**3. Skills development – discussion of specific policy-questions overcomes preconceived ideological notions and breaks out of traditional pedagogical frameworks by positing students as agents of decision-making**

**Esberg and Sagan 12**

(\*Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND \*\*Scott Sagan is a professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” 2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108)

These **government** or quasi-government think tank **simulations** often **provide** very similar **lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations**. **Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives,** the need to practice internal coordination, **and the necessity to compromise and coordinate** with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how **crisis exercises** and war games **forced** government **officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia**,’’ **moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively** **about how others might react in a crisis or conflict**.6 The **skills of imagination** **and the** subsequent **ability to predict foreign interests** and reactions **remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers**. For example, **simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis**\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\***highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences** and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, **the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states**, both allies and adversaries, **would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7 By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs**, **and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions** **about how other governments behave and how their own government works**.8 **Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork**.9 More broadly, **simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice**.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: **they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.**’’11 **Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.**12 **Role-playing exercises** certainly **encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style**. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, **students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others**.13 Facts can change quickly; **simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.**14

**Specifically empowering students through academic debates of presidential war powers are necessary to check excessive executive war-making**

**Young 13 – Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Forensics at Wayne State**

(Kelly, “Why Should We Debate About Restriction of Presidential War Powers,” 9-4-13, <http://public.cedadebate.org/node/13>, accessed 9-4-13 //Bosley)

**Beyond its obviously timeliness, we believed debating about presidential war powers was important because of the stakes involved in the controversy**. Since the Korean War, **scholars and pundits have grown increasingly alarmed by the growing scope and techniques of presidential war making**. In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress passed the joint War Powers Resolution (WPR) to increase Congress’s role in foreign policy and war making by requiring executive consultation with Congress prior to the use of military force, reporting within 48 hours after the start of hostiles, and requiring the close of military operations after 60 days unless Congress has authorized the use of force. Although the WPR was a significant legislative feat, 30 years since its passage, presidents have frequently ignores the WPR requirements and the changing nature of conflict does not fit neatly into these regulations. After the terrorist attacks on 9-11, many experts worry that executive war powers have expanded far beyond healthy limits. Consequently, **there is a fear that continued expansion of these powers will undermine the constitutional system of checks and balances that maintain the democratic foundation of this country and risk constant and unlimited military actions**, particularly in what Stephen Griffin refers to as a “long war” period like the War on Terror (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674058286). In comparison, pro-presidential powers advocates contend that new restrictions undermine flexibility and timely decision-making necessary to effectively counter contemporary national security risks. Thus, a debate about presidential wars powers is important to investigate a number of issues that have serious consequences on the status of democratic checks and national security of the United States. Lastly, **debating presidential war powers is important because we the people have an important role in affecting the use of presidential war powers**. As many legal scholars contend, **regardless of the status of legal structures to check the presidency, an important political restrain on presidential war powers is the presence of a well-informed and educated public.** As Justice Potter Stewart explains, “**the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power…may lie in an enlightened citizenry – in an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government**” (http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC\_CR\_0403\_0713\_ZC3.html). As a result, **this is not simply an academic debate about institutions and powers that that do not affect us**. As the numerous recent foreign policy scandals make clear, anyone who uses a cell-phone or the internet is potential affected by unchecked presidential war powers. **Even if we agree that these powers are justified, it is important that today’s college students understand and appreciate the scope and consequences of presidential war powers, as** these **students’ opinions will stand as an important potential check on the presidency**.

**4. Stasis – even if it is possible to debate the aff, a focus on a specific policy action is more productive by providing a limited topic of discussion and equitable ground**

**Steinberg and Freeley 08**

(David L. – Lecturer of Communication Studies at the University of Miami, and Austin – Criminal, Personal Injury, and Civil Rights Law Attorney, “Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making,” 12th Edition, http://www.scribd.com/doc/54200547/Argumentation, p43-45, accessed 7-18-12 //Bosley)

**Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement** on a tact or value or policy, **there is no need for debate**: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. **Where there is no clash of ideas,** proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, **there is no debate**. In addition, **debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question** or questions **to be answered.** For example, **general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration.** How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely **you can think of many** more **concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area** of illegal immigration. **Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy.** To be discussed and resolved effectively, **controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate** during the summer of 2007. Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same **concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with**." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but **without a focus for their discussions**, **they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed**—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—**then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step.** **One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies.** The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. **They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made**, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likedc=ly to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, **the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation.** If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose. Although we now have **a general subject**, we have not yet stated a problem. It **is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument**. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. **This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy;** in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. **The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference**, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

### K

### 1NC K

#### The affirmative’s K of American policy is dangerous—it contributes to the collapse of US primacy

Kagan, 98

(Robert, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and PhD in American History from American U, “The Benevolent Empire,” Foreign Policy. Summer, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=275> //shree)

Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did during the Cold War, lest the entire international system come crashing down around them. What they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by conservatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperialism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present. In other words, foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget — even if most of the rest of the world does not — just how important continued American dominance is to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling.

**Heg collapse triggers every impact**

**Heritage, 11**

(Heritage Foundation, “A Strong National Defense: The Armed Forces America Needs and What They Will Cost”, April 5, pdf) NL

Vital National Interests **U.S. national interests have remained remarkably consistent since World War II, despite the changing threat environment**. **They include: 1. Safeguarding U.S. national security; 2. Preventing a major power threat to Europe, East Asia, or the Persian Gulf; 3. Maintaining access to foreign trade; 4. Protecting Americans against threats to their lives and well-being; and 5. Maintaining access to resources. Above all, the U.S. armed forces protect America’s territory, borders, and airspace as well as sea-lanes, space, and cyberspace. This includes maintaining access to resources that are essential to long-term U.S. national security and the U.S. economy. Accordingly, the United States upholds the principle of freedom of the seas and space to promote and protect commerce among nations**. From Challenges to Requirements to Costs National security challenges drive force structure requirements: how many brigades, wings, carrier groups, and other military assets are needed; where they are deployed; and how they are used. The requirements determine the costs. The force structure presented in this paper was developed using the same analytical methods that Pentagon planners and the Armed Services Committees of Congress use to determine U.S. defense needs. The underlying principle is that **any considerations of force size and capability must begin with determining likely missions based on security interests: · What will the U.S. military be expected to do? · What key challenges will it likely face in protecting vital U.S. interests at home and abroad? · What capabilities will the military need? · How much will it cost over the next five years? · What are the possible consequences of failing to develop and maintain these capabilities?** This analysis did not consider alternative force structures. Its purpose was simply to demonstrate how current and projected capabilities align with legitimate defense requirements. This analysis describes the dangers that U.S. military forces will likely face and the capabilities needed to meet those dangers in five strategically important regions: Asia, the Middle East, Europe, the American homeland, and globally. The President’s fiscal year (FY) 2012 budget request is used as a baseline. 2 **A Strong National Defense** This analysis also examined authoritative open-source documents, such as the *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) and the 2010 QDR Independent Panel report. However, this paper envisions a more robust force than the one proposed in the 2010 QDR. Other Elements of National Power This analysis focuses on military tasks that are not readily fungible. That is to say, other instruments of national power such as diplomacy and economic power, even if deployed effectively, cannot alone substitute for the projection of military power in accomplishing these tasks. The analysis also acknowledges that the other instruments of power are often most effective when supported by military force. **Credible military power has a synergistic effect that makes the other elements of national power more influential and effective**. For example, the 2007 surge of forces in Iraq created the opportunity to establish the civilian government, construct a market economy, and build the institutions of civil society. Friends and Allies **U.S. contributions to collective security must be determined by what best protects America’s vital interests.** This analysis recognizes that friends, allies, and overseas bases contribute to collective defense. In turn, the U.S. provides capabilities, such as Aegis cruisers and the fifth-generation F-35 fighter aircraft, that enable coalition forces to operate more effectively together**. U.S. contributions are critical. If America does less, most U.S. friends and allies are unlikely to do more. Some may not even support U.S. efforts or may make accommodations and concessions to U.S. adversaries instead. In addition, when the U.S. cuts back programs fielded in concert with U.S. allies, such as the F-35, the collective defense of all countries suffers**. Accounting for Risk **Failure to prepare for potential threats is the best way to ensure that they will become real threats.** **The world is a dangerous place.** The U.S. military is already pressed to meet its commitments because of the long-term effects of the “peace dividend” taken after the collapse of the Soviet Union. **The demands on the U.S. military will likely not lessen in the mid term. Further cuts in U.S. force structure will only increase the risks** to U.S. forces. Maintaining a military below minimum commonsense levels would limit the U.S. to undertaking only one major military operation at a time. If faced with domestic crises like Hurricane Katrina or unexpected overseas contingencies, the U.S. would be forced to choose between ongoing tasks or simply not responding. Vital national interests tend to remain constant, but dramatic changes, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and 9/11, can change strategic requirements. Such events are not always predictable. While leaders should try to be sufficiently flexible to adapt to rapid change, these shifts cannot serve as the basis for defense planning any more than winning the lottery should be part of a plan to balance the family budget. Making radical changes in forces, such as sharply cutting the number of fighters or reducing ballistic missile defense (BMD) requirements, may save money in the short term; but in the long run, it will increase both the costs and the risks by disrupting the sustained investment needed to maintain core defense capabilities*.* 3 Since the end of the Cold War, America’s military has operated at a far higher operational tempo than it did during the Cold War. However, while the military has been busier than ever, its size and strength have declined. The Air Force is smaller and its inventory is older than at any time since its inception in 1947. The Navy has fewer ships than at any time since 1916. All three services are 30 percent to 40 percent smaller than they were during Desert Storm. As a result, the National Guard and Reserves have been constantly mobilized, and a number of Army units are on their fifth or sixth deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan. America depends on its existing forces to respond to both anticipated and unanticipated events. It cannot rely on a “just-in-time” industrial base or mass mobilization plans to meet every unexpected challenge. The force structure proposed in this paper is designed to mitigate these risks. Affordability Force structure is constrained by cost and requires balancing what is required to secure vital national interests with what the nation can afford. In historical terms, whether as a percentage of the federal budget or as a share of national wealth, the cost of a robust force described in this analysis is near post–World War II lows. However, policymakers cannot ignore the fiscal challenges facing the nation, including the growing cost of big government and the economic impediments caused by high taxes. Sustaining U.S. forces over time will require addressing four issues: · Entitlement spending. If left unchecked, entitlement spending will eventually consume the entire federal budget, crowding out defense spending. · Defense manpower costs. Compensation costs must be controlled without cutting overall manpower levels or reducing the quality of those serving. · Wasteful, unnecessary, and inefficient defense expenditures. Wasteful spending absorbs funding needed for modernizing and recapitalizing the military. · Non-defense programs in the defense budget. Such programs should be transferred out of the defense budget or eliminated altogether. Reducing U.S. forces below strategic requirements would also endanger U.S. prosperity and economic growth. **If the United States lacks the capacity to protect its vital interests, both its security and its economy will suffer in the long term.** Section II Asia The U.S. has vital economic, political, and strategic interests in Asia. **The U.S. and its Asian friends and allies face a variety of current challenges and developing threats**. **The People’s Republic of China: The Greatest Potential Challenger** One prevailing geopolitical assumption is that the more two nations are intertwined economically, the less likely they are to go to war with each other. Beijing has been distancing itself from economic freedom, and unlike other potential opponents in Asia, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) possesses sufficient economic, political, human, and diplomatic resources to threaten vital U.S. interests. **It is unrealistic to assume that the PRC and U.S. will automatically accommodate each other’s interests or that there is no potential for conflict** in the years to come. The PRC is engaged in a large-scale military modernization program, which is not surprising given that China now has the world’s second largest economy and increasingly depends on imports of oil and other raw materials. Yet many aspects of this program appear to be focused more on denying the United States access to East Asian waters than on self-defense. The PRC’s military modernization includes extensive efforts to improve its conventional naval and air capabilities, including designing and deploying modern nuclear submarines, stealth fighters, tanker aircraft, and electronic warfare aircraft. These efforts are supplemented by its growing missile forces, including short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan and anti-ship ballistic missiles to counter U.S. aircraft carrier groups. **China is also investing heavily in space capabilities, including a variety of satellite and anti-space systems,** **and cyber warfare capabilities to exploit and attack computer networks**. The People’s Liberation Army is striving to ensure that it can project and sustain military power during a sustained conflict. To this end, China has devoted substantial efforts to developing military doctrine and training infrastructure. These improvements coincide with continued development of its nuclear program. Recently, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper noted that **China has the capability to be the gravest threat to the United States.** Signs of confrontation are growing. Because U.S. vessels are operating in waters claimed by China, Beijing has used dangerous and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea to compel the U.S. to leave the area. **Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Center of Global Terrorism** **The threats of a Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan and continued global terrorism directed by al-Qaeda’s core leadership operating in Pakistan’s tribal border areas make stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan vital to U.S. national security interests**. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban maintain an important alliance, with al-Qaeda facilitating Taliban recruitment, access to training, and international financing and providing ideological inspiration. The Taliban, in turn, help al-Qaeda to maintain a safe haven in Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal belt, where the Taliban originated and maintain family ties. U.S. and coalition forces have had recent success against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan, largely due to the U.S. troop surge in 2010. **The U.S. and coalition forces need to maintain military pressure on the Taliban in order to shape the political environment to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a safe haven for terrorists intent on attacking America**. It is premature to consider withdrawing substantial numbers of troops this summer. Intensified drone missile attacks during the past two years have further degraded al-Qaeda’s ability to organize and carry out terrorist plots, but the U.S. needs more assistance from Pakistani security forces. While Pakistan has conducted military operations in the tribal areas, it continues to hedge its support for militant groups, such as the Jalaluddin Haqqani network in North Waziristan, and is reluctant to crack down on the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) terrorist group, which orchestrated the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India. Pakistan still views the Haqqani network and LeT as vital assets in limiting Indian regional influence. The U.S. needs to maintain an effective military presence in the region to demonstrate long-term U.S. commitment and to encourage Indo–Pakistani engagement so that Pakistan will reevaluate the “benefits” of maintaining links to terrorist groups. **Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons increases the potential threat to the global community if Islamist extremists gain influence in the country. A strong U.S. vision and long-term commitment to this vital region is imperative to maintaining global security and ensuring that nuclear weapons stay out of the hands of terrorists.** North Korea: A Threat to Global Peace and Stability **North Korea poses both a multifaceted military threat to peace and stability in Asia and a global proliferation risk.** Its conventional forces remain a direct threat to South Korea—a key ally that the United States is treaty-bound to defend. North Korea’s million-man army has deployed 70 percent of its ground forces within 60 miles of South Korea. War would further jeopardize the stability of a region that includes China and key U.S. allies and is vital to global commerce. **Pyongyang’s attacks on a South Korean naval ship and shelling of a civilian-inhabited island in 2010 were chilling reminders of the tenuous state of peace on the peninsula. These unprovoked acts of war reflect an abandonment of self-imposed constraints and the increased likelihood of conflict**. Since there were no consequences for those actions, North Korea will feel free to escalate the situation further to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Although the status of its nuclear weapons program is unclear, North Korea has developed enough fissile material to build six to eight nuclear bombs and has conducted two nuclear tests. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has warned that “North Korea is becoming a direct threat to the United States” because it will likely have an intercontinental ballistic missile within five years. North Korea has 600 Scud missiles targeting South Korea; 300 No Dong missiles, which can reach Japan; and the Musudan missile, which can hit U.S. bases on Guam and Okinawa. These factors, combined with the unhinged North Korean rhetoric, demonstrate the threat to the U.S. and regional allies. Pyongyang also poses a grave proliferation risk. For decades it has exported missiles and technology to rogue regimes, and **it is directly involved or suspected of direct involvement in the Iranian, Syrian, and Burmese nuclear weapons programs**. In September 2007, Israel destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor that was being constructed with covert North Korean assistance. Force Structure for Asia As the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel concluded in 2010, “The force structure in the Asia– Pacific area needs to be increased.” Without a larger force than the one outlined in the 2010 QDR, the U.S. could lose “the ability to transit freely the areas of the Western Pacific for security and economic reasons.” For example, if China blocks freedom of transit in the South China Sea, the disruption of trade would be a disaster for U.S. allies, such as Taiwan, which imports 98 percent of its oil via the South China Sea. Use of force by China would have a devastating effect on U.S.–PRC relations, inhibiting the ability of the U.S. to cooperate with regional allies. The 2009 Australian Defense White Paper forecasts that in the future, the U.S. will not have the capacity to counter this threat because of declining U.S. military presence. Furthermore, the Naval Operations Concept 2010 suggests that with the planned 33 amphibious ship fleet, the U.S. would be unable to field two complete Marine expeditionary bridgades (MEB), thus limiting us to one fullscale Marine force pojection at a time. To address such concerns, the U.S. military forces require increased capacity, primarily in air, sea, missile defense, space, and cyber capabilities. Essential forces include: 1 corps headquarters; 6 division headquarters; 17 infantry brigade combat teams; 3 Stryker brigade combat teams; 10 heavy brigade combat teams; 10 combat aviation brigades; 7 Patriot battalions; 3 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries; 4 aircraft carriers and 4 carrier wings; 43 large surface combatants, including 14 BMD-capable combatants; 11 small surface combatants; 7 mine countermeasure ships; 22 amphibious warfare ships; 13 attack submarines; 2 guided missile submarines; 75 land-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare aircraft (manned and unmanned); 1 maritime prepositioning squadron; 15 combat logistics force ships; 12 command and support vessels; 26 roll-on/roll-off strategic sealift vessels; 1 Marine expeditionary force; 1 Marine division, consisting of 4 infantry regiments and 1 artillery regiment; 1 Marine aircraft wing; 1 Marine logistics group; 2 Marine expeditionary unit command elements; 4 Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) wing-equivalents; 16 airlift and aerial refueling wing-equivalents; 8 A Strong National Defense 22 tactical fighter squadrons; 3 long-range strike (bomber) wings; 1 command and control wing; 2 fully operational air and space operations centers; Space and cyberspace wings; Special operations teams; Ranger battalions; and Special Forces–capable tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary mission aircraft. 9 Section III The Middle East **The United States has a vital interest in ensuring that a hostile power does not exercise hegemony over the Middle East, which is not only a key region for global trade and an investment hub, but also a potential source of transnational terrorism and nuclear proliferation**. In addition, the U.S. needs to preserve its capacity to support and act in concert with Israel, a key U.S. ally in the region. Iran: A Threat to Regional Stability **The regime in Iran poses the most significant threat to U.S. interests. It sponsors terrorism** as part of its foreign policy, **repeatedly threatens the existence of both Israel and the United States, and is actively seeking to establish a regional hegemony and undermine U.S. influence** in the region. Iran continues to develop nuclear weapons. Its leaders are deeply committed to building nuclear and ballistic missiles in defiance of U.N. Security Council restrictions. While estimates vary, the intelligence community estimated in 2010 that Iran could have a nuclear weapon within one or two years. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that Iran has increased the number of uranium-enriching centrifuges at its Natanz facility from about 3,000 in late 2007 to more than 8,000. In 2010, Iran unveiled even faster centrifuges to speed up enrichment, and it has stockpiled more than 3,000 kilograms of low-enriched uranium—enough to produce at least two nuclear weapons if the uranium is further enriched. Tehran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it continues to increase their range, scale, and payload capabilities. Its new two-stage solid-propellant missile could soon be capable of reaching Eastern Europe—far beyond Israel. According to a recent National Intelligence Estimate, many of Iran’s ballistic missiles “are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload.” Iran could have a nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile by 2015, enabling it to hold governments around the world hostage simply by threatening to launch its missiles. Iran poses a threat to shipping and oil transported through the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, it continues to support foreign terrorist elements, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Taliban. If Iran achieves a nuclear capability, it could provide nuclear weapons to terrorists to carry out its ambitions. **Likely influenced by Iran, in the past four years, at least 14 countries in the Middle East and North Africa have announced intentions to pursue civilian nuclear programs, which are viewed by many as a hedge against the possibility of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran will multiply this phenomenon, resulting in a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.** Furthermore, the United States should be wary of cooperation between anti-American regimes, such as Iran’s cooperation with Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez in Venezuela. Finally, Iran has sought to undermine the coalition in Iraq and U.S. relations with longtime U.S. allies in the region, including Turkey and the Gulf states. Syria and Hezbollah: Sources of Instability Syria and Hezbollah pose more limited threats to U.S. interests, but they continue to actively threaten Israel and pro-Western forces in Lebanon. Syria is refusing to cooperate with the IAEA on its nuclear program. It also maintains an active missile and chemical weapons program. Syria and Hezbollah cooperate against Israel, and Syria also allows terrorists to pass through its territory into Iraq. Lebanon has recently undergone dramatic power shifts. Lebanese President Michel Suleiman selected Najib Mikati, a Hezbollah ally, to form a new government. If Hezbollah develops a stronger hold, it will use Lebanon as a staging area for arms and drug smuggling, money laundering, and terrorist activities in the region and around the world. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and Somalia While many of al-Qaeda’s “core” leaders have sought refuge in Pakistan’s tribal areas, Yemen’s al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has arguably emerged as a more immediate threat. Continued Predator drone strikes in Pakistan have led many al-Qaeda cadres to shift their operations to Yemen. **AQAP has had a long presence in Yemen, and** in just the past 18 months, **it has played a role in at least four terrorist plots and attacks against the United States.** For example, the 2009 “Christmas day bomber” in Detroit was aided and trained in Yemen. **The U.S. needs to prevent al-Qaeda from moving its base of operations from Pakistan to Yemen or Somalia. It should place a top priority on intercepting al-Qaeda leaders in transit.** Al-Shabab, a radical Islamist group, controls much of southern and central Somalia. The al-Qaeda network has operated in Somalia before and has worked with Somali Islamists since the early 1990s. Al-Shabab and al-Qaeda coordinate training camps and share ideology. Iraq: Looking to the Future Iraq is becoming a strong and influential U.S. ally in the region in addition to providing a potential model to its neighbors for revitalizing its political economy and civil society. However, Iraq will need continued U.S. military support and assistance beyond 2011 to prevent radical Islamist groups and Iran from gaining influence and undermining progress. Political Upheaval: Responding to an Uncertain Future **Political turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East will require the U.S. to sustain a capacity to engage proactively in the region. The U.S. also needs to respond to sudden and unpredictable change, including the loss of bases and the emergence of new threats, such as terrorist links to maritime pirates**. The consequences of current events may not become clear for several years, but **the U.S. needs to prepare now**. Force Structure for the Middle East Without a robust force structure available for the Middle East, the U.S. will be unable to respond to significant crises on land or sea. For example, an Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would disrupt global commerce. At present, 20 percent of the world’s petroleum products transits the strait. If that trade were halted, the U.S., for example, would quickly exhaust its Strategic Petroleum Reserves. The effects in the U.S. would be immediate and significant. According to a 2008 Heritage Foundation analysis, the U.S. would lose more than 1 million jobs, the price of oil would approximately double, and real disposable income would decrease by $260 billion. Given the current turmoil in the Middle East, reducing the force structure in this theater would be irresponsible. The U.S. must be prepared for the sudden loss of access to bases in this region. Furthermore, missile defenses need to be increased significantly to mitigate the threat of missile attacks by Iran or other regimes. Essential forces include: 1 corps headquarters; 8 division headquarters; 20 infantry brigade combat teams; 4 Stryker brigade combat teams; 12 heavy brigade combat teams; 10 combat aviation brigades; 7 Patriot battalions; 3 THAAD batteries; 3 aircraft carriers and 3 carrier wings; 25 large surface combatants, including 14 BMD-capable combatants; 19 small surface combatants; 7 mine countermeasure ships; 12 amphibious warfare ships; 22 attack submarines; 2 guided missile submarines; 60 land-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare aircraft (manned and unmanned); 1 maritime prepositioning squadron; 12 combat logistics force ships; 8 command and support vessels; 20 roll-on/roll-off strategic sealift vessels; 1 Marine expeditionary force; 1 Marine division, consisting of 4 infantry regiments and 1 artillery regiment; 1 Marine aircraft wing; 1 Marine logistics group; 2 Marine expeditionary unit command elements; 3 Air Force ISR wing-equivalents; 12 airlift and aerial refueling wing-equivalents; 18 tactical fighter squadrons; 2 long-range strike (bomber) wings; 1 command and control wing; 5 fully operational air and space operations centers; Space and cyberspace wings; Special operations teams; Ranger battalions; and Special Forces–capable tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary mission aircraft 13 Section IV Europe **A secure and prosperous Europe is vital to U.S. interests. America and European nations engage in the world’s largest bilateral trade and investment relationship, accounting for one-third of world trade and more than half of the global economy.** In addition, the U.S. is able to safeguard its economic and security interests around the world because of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S. bases in Europe, which enable it to project its power quickly and effectively. The enemies of the United States understand this. Nuclear Ballistic Missile Threats: Vulnerabilities of Key Allies and Bases The threat of ballistic missile attack can be seen in Iran’s emerging capability to target several European nations. An attack on Europe would require a U.S. response. France and Britain are Europe’s only nuclear powers. Britain and the U.S. belong to NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, which effectively provides a NATO-wide nuclear deterrent and/or guarantee to the other NATO states. Missile defenses and conventional forces are essential to limiting the likelihood of a nuclear conflict. However**, if Iran attacks Europe, the U.S. would face the possibility of using its nuclear weapons on behalf of its allies**. Transnational Terrorism and Radicalization: Danger to Allies and Assets **The Global Terrorism Database, which catalogs terrorist events around the world, reveals an increasing Islamist terrorist threat to Europe.** After 9/11, through June 2008, al-Qaeda sponsored, inspired, and directed 28 plots against NATO members. In the United Kingdom alone, intelligence reports estimate that at least 2,000 individuals have been identified as threats to national security because of their support for terrorism. Spain and Germany served as logistical bases for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. European nationals have been found fighting against coalition troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. Considering that 9/11 prompted NATO to invoke its Article V (common defense of the alliance) guarantee for the first time, **a large-scale terrorist attack against Europe would have significant implications for the United States**. Further, a terrorist attack on an International Security Assistance Force member could create considerable pressure for it to withdraw from military commitments in Afghanistan. A 9/11-style attack in Europe would also put the U.S. in the position of needing to respond quickly or lose its leading role in NATO and potentially even cause NATO to collapse. Given that most U.S. security analysts accept that **the U.S. will need to rely on its allies for support and access in warfare, it is important to keep the alliance together.** Whether Turkey will continue to be a dependable NATO partner is in doubt. In 2003, Turkey denied U.S.-led coalition forces the use of its facilities for operations against Saddam Hussein. **Russian Adventurism: A Source of Potential Instability and Confrontation** Moscow continues to pursue a policy that claims a privileged interest in the area of the former Soviet Union, which even includes some NATO and European Union (EU) member states. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008 and subsequent recognition of South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence redrew Europe’s borders by force. **Russia remains a threat** to the territorial integrity of neighboring states. However, Russia’s armed forces performed poorly in Georgia, defeating Georgian forces by numerical superiority. In September 2008, Russia began to transform its armed forces into a smaller, more mobile force equipped with modern weaponry. It has sought to procure the French *Mistral*-class amphibious assault ship. Furthermore, Russia is a nuclear power that, under New START, will equal the U.S. in intercontinental ballistic missiles in the future while having an estimated 20-to-1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Russia’s use of force against its neighbors is a direct military threat to Russia’s former Soviet neighbors and NATO. Until recently, America’s military presence and leadership has assured NATO allies and deterred potential aggression. The U.S. has also sought to build capacity and interoperability with its allies and partners. A drawdown of U.S. force presence in Europe would create a vacuum that Russia would rush to fill, strengthening its claim for a sphere of privileged interest**. It is also likely that Russia will compete increasingly with NATO and EU nations for natural resources, including oil, and commerce in the Arctic as transpolar travel routes become more open to maritime navigation, reducing transit times by as much as 40 percent**. Protecting and preserving open seaways is a vital U.S. national interest. Failed States on Europe’s Borders: A Common Anxiety **Failing states in the Balkans, North Africa, and Central Asia present a range of threats against Europe and the U.S. In addition to humanitarian implications and human trafficking, they provide safe havens for terrorists and are sources of mass emigration, transnational crime, and violence that spill over into Europe, creating widespread instability. They can disrupt the flow of oil and gas to Europe, and they are vulnerable to takeover by autocratic leaders.** The dangers of a failed state might not directly threaten the U.S. for years. Nevertheless, over the long term, the result could be another Somalia, which would complicate U.S. leadership in the region. Force Structure for Europe Operations such as those conducted in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan could not have been accomplished as effectively as they were without the forces organized to support the European theater. For example, if Russia were to threaten a NATO country with military force, such as the invasion of Georgia in 2008, the U.S. would be hard-pressed to meet its NATO commitments with conventional forces. When The Heritage Foundation examined the outcome of similar scenarios in a future proliferated environment that included independent nuclear-armed powers such as Iran, deterrence failed and nuclear weapons were used. Furthermore, collective defense requires NATO to protect its members’ borders and to act outside its borders to ensure its security. The U.S. needs to maintain its presence in Europe so that it can sustain expeditionary capabilities. In particular, U.S. bases may need to support operations if the U.S. suddenly loses access to facilities in the Middle East. Finally, **the U.S. needs to ensure that its strategic, conventional, and missile defense forces remain balanced and complementary. Otherwise, an outside power could attempt to use the threat of conventional conflict or nuclear attack to hold America or other NATO allies hostage and prevent them from reinforcing one another**. Essential forces include: 15 1 corps headquarters; 8 division headquarters; 20 infantry brigade combat teams; 4 Stryker brigade combat teams; 12 heavy brigade combat teams; 10 combat aviation brigades; 7 Patriot battalions; 3 THAAD batteries; 3 aircraft carriers and 3 carrier wings; 25 large surface combatants, including 14 BMD-capable combatants; 19 small surface combatants; 7 mine countermeasure ships; 12 amphibious warfare ships; 22 attack submarines; 2 guided missile submarines; 60 land-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare aircraft (manned and unmanned); 1 maritime prepositioning squadron; 12 combat logistics force ships; 8 command and support vessels; 20 roll-on/roll-off strategic sealift vessels; 1 Marine expeditionary force; 1 Marine division, consisting of 3 infantry regiments and 1 artillery regiment; 1 Marine aircraft wing; 1 Marine logistics group; 2 Marine expeditionary unit command elements; 3 Air Force ISR wing-equivalents; 12 airlift and aerial refueling wing-equivalents; 18 tactical fighter squadrons; 2 long-range strike (bomber) wings; 1 command and control wing; 5 fully operational air and space operations centers; Space and cyberspace wings; Special operations teams; Ranger battalions; and Special Forces–capable tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary mission aircraft. 17 Section V The American Homeland Defending the American homeland is a primary responsibility of the U.S. military. The military also plays a role in responding to catastrophic disasters. Catastrophic Disaster Response: Military Assistance to Civilian Authorities Predesignating response forces is especially important for reacting to natural or man-made (e.g., terrorist) catastrophes. In a catastrophic disaster that endangers tens of thousands of lives or more and billions of dollars in infrastructure, the national response needs to be immediate, massive, and effective, not only because people and property are at risk, but also because the government’s credibility at all levels is in jeopardy. If citizens perceive the government response as credible, that perception can measurably defuse tension, fear, and frustration, prompting communities to be more resilient in their own responses to the catastrophe. Having the U.S. military play a prominent role in the immediate response to catastrophic disasters makes sense. It would be counterproductive and ruinously expensive for other federal agencies, local governments, or the private sector to maintain the excess capacity and resources needed for immediate catastrophic response. Maintaining this capacity would also be beneficial to the military. For example, the Pentagon could use response forces for tasks directly related to its primary war-fighting jobs—such as theater support to civilian governments during a conflict, counterinsurgency missions, and postwar occupation—and for homeland security. Military forces are not first responders. In most cases, meeting the immediate needs of the community is necessarily the responsibility of the local community, its police and fire departments, and its other emergency management assets. However, major disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, chemical and biological incidents, and nuclear attacks can quickly overwhelm the capacity of state and local governments to safeguard life and property. **Cyber Threats:** Protecting the U.S. from State and Nonstate Enemies **Government and private information networks are increasingly under attack from a variety of state-sponsored and nonstate actors.** According to a 2001 report from the the General Accounting Office (now known as the Government Accountability Office): Daily, [the Department of Defense] identifies and records thousands of “cyber events,” some of which are determined to be attacks against systems and networks. These attacks may be perpetrated by individuals inside or outside the organization, including hackers, foreign-sponsored entities, employees, former employees, and contractors or other service providers. The widely publicized cyber assaults against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008 highlight the danger of statesponsored threats against U.S. networks. They demonstrate how adversarial states are using malicious online activity as a tool of national policy. **Revelations of Chinese cyber espionage against sensitive information networks in the United States, Germany, and elsewhere have further heightened concerns that the World Wide Web is becoming another battlefield.** 18 A Strong National Defense Nonstate cyber threats include Islamist hackers who have promoted the tactic of “electronic jihad,” attacking “enemy” Web sites to undermine morale and harm economic and military infrastructure. Many Islamist Web sites host forums that discuss how to conduct such Web-based attacks. The Web is a target-rich environment. The Department of Defense (DOD) alone has 3.5 million computers and 35 internal networks in 65 countries, many of which depend on commercial systems. According to the Defense Science Board, not only do cyber attacks represent a general threat, but the majority of military and DOD operations are susceptible to their effects. Furthermore, terrorist groups use the Web for recruiting, fund-raising, propaganda, intelligence gathering, and planning operations. Enemies could create a catastrophic failure in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, which monitor and control most U.S. infrastructure. Such an attack could cause power outages, spark explosions, and unleash fuel spills. Although these systems are not part of the Internet, governments and the private sector have been employing “enterprise-wide” architectures that link SCADA systems to the Web. As a result, they have potentially created a large number of gateways into some of America’s most sensitive networks. For example, the Stuxnet computer worm is highly sophisticated malware designed to target SCADA systems. Border Security: Ensuring American Sovereignty, Commerce, and Safety Mexican criminal cartels dominate the U.S. illicit drug market and are prominent in human smuggling, gun trafficking, and money laundering. As the cartels fight to control trafficking routes, they increasingly threaten both Mexico’s stability and public safety in the U.S. Cartels virtually rule parts of Mexico, and the violence and murder are spilling across the border. In 2010, the death toll in Mexico exceeded 15,000. More than 34,000 have been killed in the past four years. In addition, at least seven major terrorist organizations have an active presence in Latin America, including three with ties to transnational Islamic terrorist groups. Other U.S. interests include Mexico’s economic success. Mexico is America’s second largest trading partner. The rest of Latin America accounts for less than 6 percent of U.S. trade, but trade with Latin America has great potential to grow. Already, nearly 30 percent of America’s crude oil imports come from Latin America. Air Defense: Sovereignty and Security of America’s Skies **The successful 9/11 terrorist attacks highlighted the importance of maintaining early warning and response capability over U.S. airspace**. During the attacks, the Federal Aviation Administration was notified of terrorist hijackings of four planes, but it failed to warn the U.S. military in time to respond before the planes struck their targets. The attacks prompted a major increase in air defense over U.S. cities, culminating in Operation Noble Eagle. This included monitoring and intercepting flights, air patrols over cities and critical infrastructure, and controlling the airspace over Washington, D.C., and other major cities. From September 11, 2001, through 2008, NORAD monitored 2,700 unknown aircraft and directed more than 45,000 defensive maneuvers under Noble Eagle. Maritime Security: Protecting the Lifeline of U.S. Commerce The importance of maintaining situational awareness and response in the maritime domain cannot be overstated. **Almost one-third of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) derives from trade, of which 95 percent is transported by sea. More than $1.3 billion worth of goods moves in and out of U.S. ports every day. In addition, many major urban centers accounting for more than half of the U.S. population and significant critical infrastructure are close to ports or accessible by waterways. Maritime security also has a critical defense dimension.** The vast majority of U.S. military forces and supplies projected overseas transit through U.S. ports. In FY 2003, the U.S. Military Traffic Management Command shipped more than 1.6 million tons of cargo in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Force Structure for the Homeland The U.S. lacks sufficient resources to deal with catastrophic disasters, such as one on a scale of the disaster caused by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan. For example, a nuclear warhead detonated over a U.S. city could reduce an area of up to 40 square miles to roaring flames, depending on the warhead’s yield and other factors. It would ignite more fires within a larger area of perhaps 65 square miles. In a nuclear attack on Washington, D.C., those of the 5.3 million people in the metropolitan area who survived the first hour after the attack would be in a desperate situation. **The U.S. would need a substantial force of specially organized, trained, and equipped military personnel to organize a credible response**. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel unequivocally concluded: QDR force structure will not provide sufficient capacity to respond to a domestic catastrophe that might occur during a period of ongoing contingency operations abroad. The role of reserve components needs to be reviewed, with an eye to ensuring that a portion of the National Guard be dedicated to and funded for homeland defense. The panel added that “the expanding cyber mission also needs to be examined. The Department of Defense should be prepared to assist civil authorities in defending cyberspace—beyond the Department’s current role.” The RAND study *Army Forces for Homeland Security* suggests several changes in the force structure in response to potential threats. Specifically, the study recommends creating: · A dedicated rapid-reaction brigade of 3,600 soldiers that rotates between active and reserves; · A rapidly deployable and dedicated force of 6,200 soldiers for counterterrorism and border security; · Dedicated rapid-response regional civil support battalions totaling some 8,900 soldiers; and · A dedicated pool of reserve support totaling some 7,560 soldiers. Based on these recommendations, the force structure needed to defend the American homeland would include: 7 homeland defense, counterterrorism, and civil support brigades; 10 tactical fighter wings; Airlift and aerial refueling wing-equivalents; Space and cyberspace wings; Special operations teams; and Special Forces–capable tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and primary mission aircraft. 21 Section VI Global Dangers **The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and the means to deliver them is increasing the likelihood that the U.S. or an ally will suffer such an attack**. **Strategic Attacks on U.S. Territory: A Preventable Catastrophe** A cornerstone of Russian military strategy is the threat of preemptive nuclear attack against Russia’s enemies. Russia possesses a large strategic nuclear arsenal and is modernizing it, exploiting the opportunity presented by the New START nuclear arms agreement. New START establishes Russia as an equal to the U.S. in both the number of strategic nuclear weapons and the number of delivery systems. Russia will not agree to further reductions in its nuclear systems without even more draconian cuts by the U.S. The Chinese, while starting with a far smaller strategic nuclear force, are expanding and modernizing their nuclear forces. Although China will likely expand and upgrade its strategic arsenal primarily as a deterrent against Russia, these weapons could also be directed against the U.S. and its friends and allies. **Both Iran and North Korea are pursuing nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. Other potentially hostile states will likely follow suit**. Accordingly, the U.S. could face a threatening coalition of strategic nuclear powers, which will likely have other WMDs in their collective arsenal. Cooperation among countries hostile to America could include sharing technology, materials, and technical assistance and could even expand to embrace coordinated targeting and strategy. The WMD threat from hostile states is nothing less than existential. Recent research suggests that nuclear weapons are much more destructive than previously thought because of the effect of mass fire. By some estimates, **recovering from a nuclear strike against just one American city would require the equivalent of the entire U.S. economy. America is also vulnerable to the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) from a high-altitude burst of a nuclear weapon.** A congressional commission on the EMP threat to the nation’s infrastructure estimated that an EMP burst over the Midwest **could destroy the entire U.S. electrical grid**, rendering the electrical tools of daily life useless. **Life in the United States “would be a lot like life in the 1800s, except then the United States had a lot smaller population.” Just feeding modern-day America would be virtually impossible without working transportation and communications systems**. Water pumping and sewage treatment plants would be off-line. Modern medical care would be virtually nonexistent. Even if the rest of the world mustered the largest humanitarian mission in human history, the suffering would be unprecedented. **EMP attacks are often thought of as attacks against the U.S. infrastructure, but the truth is that a large-scale EMP attack would be an instrument of genocide**. Many Americans would likely die within a year from the privations and hardships associated with the loss of critical national infrastructure. Strategic Attacks on U.S. Friends and Allies: Shared Responsibilities **America leads a system of alliances in the most important regions of the world—particularly in East Asia, Europe, and the Middle East—because U.S. leaders recognize that U.S. security and liberty will be jeopardized if hostile powers come to dominate these regions**. Hence, every U.S. President has preserved and even expanded this system of alliances. U.S. allies in these regions face a variety of threats. However, a chief threat is an attack with nuclear weapons or other WMDs. The most sought-after means of delivering such weapons is the ballistic missile. Among the current or potential hostile powers are China and North Korea in East Asia, Iran and Syria in the Middle East, and Russia in Asia and Europe. These countries either already possess or are seeking nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles capable of reaching U.S. allies, deployed forces, and even the U.S. homeland. An attack on a close ally, particularly with nuclear weapons, poses nearly the same existential threat to that ally as it would to the U.S. itself. **The very prospect of such attack could undermine alliance leadership. If allies begin to doubt the U.S. capability to deter against attacks, they will start to question U.S. leadership and America’s ability to protect them, prompting them to look for security outside the current alliance system. As a result, America could see the collapse of these alliances and the rise of hostile powers in key regions.** Assured Access to Space: Losing the High Ground **Space assets and access to those assets are essential components of military power and are vital to the prosperity of the American people.** The military depends on space systems for a variety of functions, including communications, early warning of attack, battle damage assessment, intelligence, navigation, and weather forecasting. **Control of space is necessary to defend the people, territory, institutions, and infrastructure of the U.S. against ballistic missile attacks, including an EMP attack**. **The American economy depends on satellites for communication, financial transactions, navigation, and logistical support among other priorities to sustain the American way of life. The economy would be far less efficient and competitive if these satellite systems were degraded or lost**. Accordingly, preserving freedom of access to space is a vital interest. U.S. satellites are vulnerable to attack, and the Earth satellite orbits are becoming increasingly congested and contested. Even nations such as Iran and North Korea are pursuing space systems. In 2007, China successfully tested its direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. Russia also has ASAT capabilities. Losing access to space systems and satellites because of disruption or destruction would deprive the U.S. military of one of its most important and valuable “force multipliers.” Its loss would eliminate a major portion of the U.S. military’s technological edge over potential enemies. Economically, **the loss of access to or destruction of space systems would inhibit economic growth and could push America into economic decline**.

#### Ignore their hipster politics—the whining needs to end so we can face real threats

Hanson, 03

(Victor Davis, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Professor Emeritus at California University, Fresno, Ph.D. from Stanford, “We Could Still Lose.” National Review Online. August 11. <http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/3050721.html> //shree)

If one were to collate the news reports about the Mosul shootout, the lessons would be as follows: read two mass killers their Miranda rights; dodge their bullets when they shoot first; capture them alive; let Europeans cross-examine them in the Hague; lose no friendlies in the operation; do not disturb the residents next door; protect the Husseins’ victims from such oppressors (but without cracking their plaster); and in general remember that the entire scene will be filmed and then broadcast as Cops rather than as Hell Is for Heroes. I am not suggesting that we ignore the real dangers involved in ethnic profiling or discount the moral issues that arise from killing our enemy leaders and disseminating gross pictures of their corpses. And, of course, we should seek to distinguish Baathist culprits from ordinary Iraqis. My point is rather that, because we are products of an affluent and leisured West, we have a special burden to remember how tenuous and fragile civilization remains outside our suburbs. Most of us don’t fear much from the fatwa of a murderous mullah, and few have had our sisters shredded before our eyes in one of Uday’s brush chippers—much less ever seen chemical warfare trucks hosing down our block, in the same way that crop dusters fogged our backyards. Instead, we have the leisure to engage in utopian musing, assured that our economy, our unseen soldiers, or our system working on autopilot will always ensure us such prerogatives. And in the la-la land of Washington and New York, it is especially easy to forget that we are not even like our own soldiers in Iraq, now sleeping outside without toilets and air conditioners, eating dehydrated food, and trying to distinguish killers from innocents. What does all this mean? Western societies from ancient Athens to imperial Rome to the French republic rarely collapsed because of a shortage of resources or because foreign enemies proved too numerous or formidable in arms—even when those enemies were grim Macedonians or Germans. Rather, in times of peace and prosperity there arose an unreal view of the world beyond their borders, one that was the product of insularity brought about by success, and an intellectual arrogance that for some can be the unfortunate by-product of an enlightened society. I think we are indulging in this unreal hypercriticism—even apart from the election season antics of our politicians—because we are not being gassed or shot or even left hot or hungry. September 11 no longer evokes an image of incinerated firefighters, innocents leaping out of skyscrapers, or the stench of flesh and melted plastic but rather squabbles over architectural designs, lawsuits, snarling over John Ashcroft’s new statutes, or concerns about being too rude to the Arab street. Such smug dispensation—as profoundly amoral as it is—provides us, on the cheap and at a safe distance, with a sense of moral worth. Or perhaps censuring from the bleachers enables us to feel superior to those less fortunate who are still captive to their primordial appetites. We prefer to cringe at the thought that others like to see proof of their killers’ deaths, prefer to shoot rather than die capturing a mass murderer, and welcome a generic profile of those who wish to kill them en masse. We should take stock of this dangerous and growing mind-set—and remember that wealthy, sophisticated societies like our own are rarely overrun. They simply implode—whining and debating to the end, even as they pass away.

#### Vote negative to align yourself with American dominance—the unwavering rhetoric of support is critical to preserving international stability.

Kristol and Kagan, 96

(William Kristol – visiting professor in government at Harvard University and Robert Kagan – senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and PhD in American History, “Toward a Neo-Reganite Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs. July/August, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=276> //shree)

TWENTY YEARS later, it is time once again to challenge an indifferent America and a confused American conservatism. Today's lukewarm consensus about America's reduced role in a post-Cold War world is wrong. Conservatives should not accede to it; it is bad for the country and, incidentally, bad for conservatism. Conservatives will not be able to govern America over the long term if they fail to offer a more elevated vision of America's international role. What should that role be? Benevolent global hegemony. Having defeated the "evil empire," the United States enjoys strategic and ideological predominance. The first objective of U.S. foreign policy should be to preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening America's security, supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around the world. The aspiration to benevolent hegemony might strike some as either hubristic or morally suspect. But a hegemon is nothing more or less than a leader with preponderant influence and authority over all others in its domain. That is America's position in the world today. The leaders of Russia and China understand this. At their April summit meeting, Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin joined in denouncing "hegemonism" in the post-Cold War world. They meant this as a complaint about the United States. It should be taken as a compliment and a guide to action. Consider the events of just the past six months, a period that few observers would consider remarkable for its drama on the world stage. In East Asia, the carrier task forces of the U.S. Seventh Fleet helped deter Chinese aggression against democratic Taiwan, and the 35,000 American troops stationed in South Korea helped deter a possible invasion by the rulers in Pyongyang. In Europe, the United States sent 20,000 ground troops to implement a peace agreement in the former Yugoslavia, maintained 100,000 in Western Europe as a symbolic commitment to European stability and security, and intervened diplomatically to prevent the escalation of a conflict between Greece and Turkey. In the Middle East, the United States maintained the deployment of thousands of soldiers and a strong naval presence in the Persian Gulf region to deter possible aggression by Saddam Hussein's Iraq or the Islamic fundamentalist regime in Iran, and it mediated in the conflict between Israel and Syria in Lebanon. In the Western Hemisphere, the United States completed the withdrawal of 15,000 soldiers after restoring a semblance of democratic government in Haiti and, almost without public notice, prevented a military coup in Paraguay. In Africa, a U.S. expeditionary force rescued Americans and others trapped in the Liberian civil conflict. These were just the most visible American actions of the past six months, and just those of a military or diplomatic nature. During the same period, the United States made a thousand decisions in international economic forums, both as a government and as an amalgam of large corporations and individual entrepreneurs, that shaped the lives and fortunes of billions around the globe. America influenced both the external and internal behavior of other countries through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Through the United Nations, it maintained sanctions on rogue states such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq. Through aid programs, the United States tried to shore up friendly democratic regimes in developing nations. The enormous web of the global economic system, with the United States at the center, combined with the pervasive influence of American ideas and culture, allowed Americans to wield influence in many other ways of which they were entirely unconscious. The simple truth of this era was stated last year by a Serb leader trying to explain Slobodan Milosevic's decision to finally seek rapprochement with Washington. "As a pragmatist," the Serbian politician said, "Milosevic knows that all satellites of the United States are in a better position than those that are not satellites." And America's allies are in a better position than those who are not its allies. Most of the world's major powers welcome U.S. global involvement and prefer America's benevolent hegemony to the alternatives. Instead of having to compete for dominant global influence with many other powers, therefore, the United States finds both the Europeans and the Japanese -- after the United States, the two most powerful forces in the world -- supportive of its world leadership role. Those who anticipated the dissolution of these alliances once the common threat of the Soviet Union disappeared have been proved wrong. The principal concern of America's allies these days is not that it will be too dominant but that it will withdraw. Somehow most Americans have failed to notice that they have never had it so good. They have never lived in a world more conducive to their fundamental interests in a liberal international order, the spread of freedom and democratic governance, an international economic system of free-market capitalism and free trade, and the security of Americans not only to live within their own borders but to travel and do business safely and without encumbrance almost anywhere in the world. Americans have taken these remarkable benefits of the post-Cold War era for granted, partly because it has all seemed so easy. Despite misguided warnings of imperial overstretch, the United States has so far exercised its hegemony without any noticeable strain, and it has done so despite the fact that Americans appear to be in a more insular mood than at any time since before the Second World War. The events of the last six months have excited no particular interest among Americans and, indeed, seem to have been regarded with the same routine indifference as breathing and eating. And that is the problem. The most difficult thing to preserve is that which does not appear to need preserving. The dominant strategic and ideological position the United States now enjoys is the product of foreign policies and defense strategies that are no longer being pursued. Americans have come to take the fruits of their hegemonic power for granted. During the Cold War, the strategies of deterrence and containment worked so well in checking the ambitions of America's adversaries that many American liberals denied that our adversaries had ambitions or even, for that matter, that America had adversaries. Today the lack of a visible threat to U.S. vital interests or to world peace has tempted Americans to absentmindedly dismantle the material and spiritual foundations on which their national well-being has been based. They do not notice that potential challengers are deterred before even contemplating confrontation by their overwhelming power and influence. The ubiquitous post-Cold War question -- where is the threat? -- is thus misconceived. In a world in which peace and American security depend on American power and the will to use it, the main threat the United States faces now and in the future is its own weakness. American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order. The appropriate goal of American foreign policy, therefore, is to preserve that hegemony as far into the future as possible. To achieve this goal, the United States needs a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral confidence.

### Case

**Extinction first**

**Schell, 82**

(Jonathan, Professor at Wesleyan University, The Fate of the Earth, pages 136-137 THIS CARD IS GENDER MODIFIED)

Implicit in everything that I have said so far about the nuclear predicament there has been a perplexity that I would now like to take up explicitly, for it leads, I believe, into the very heart of our response-or, rather, our lack of response-to the predicament. I have pointed out that **our species is the most important of all the things that, as inhabitants of a common world, we inherit from the past generations,** but it does not go far enough to point out **this superior importance**, as though in making our decision about extinction we were being asked to choose between, say, liberty, on the one hand, and the survival of the species, on the other. For **the species not only overarches but contains all the benefits of life in the common world, and to speak of sacrificing the species for the sake of one of these benefits involves one in the absurdity of wanting to destroy something in order to preserve one of its parts, as if one were to burn down a house in an attempt to redecorate the living room, or to kill someone to improve his character**. but even to point out this absurdity fails to take the full measure of the peril of extinction, for [people] mankind **is not some invaluable object that lies outside us and that we must protect so that we can go on benefiting from it; rather, it is we ourselves, without whom everything there is loses its value.** To say this is another way of saying that **extinction is unique not because it destroys [people]** mankind **as an object but because it destroys [people]** mankind **as the source of all possible human subjects**, and this, in turn, is another way of saying that **extinction is a second death, for one's own individual death is the end not of any object in life but of the subject that experiences all objects**. Death, how- ever, places the mind in a quandary. One of-the confounding char- acteristics of death-"tomorrow's zero," in Dostoevski's phrase-is that, precisely because it removes the person himself rather than something in his life, it seems to offer the mind nothing to take hold of. **One even feels it inappropriate, in a way, to try to speak "about" death at all, as. though death were a thing situated some- where outside us and available for objective inspection, when the fact is that it is within us-is, indeed, an essential part of what we are.** It would be more appropriate, perhaps, to say that death, as a fundamental element of our being, "thinks" in us and through us about whatever we think about, coloring our thoughts and moods with its presence throughout our lives.

**Living guarantees value to life**

**Kacou, 08**

(Arrien Kacou, Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2 (2008), “Why even mind, on the a priori matter of life”, 2008, <http://cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184> NL)

Furthermore, **that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly not exist in any world without consciousness** (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, **we can begin to develop a more sophisticated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all conscious satisfaction**. In short**, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure**. (The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are correlated with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many things the experience of which we like. For example: the admiration of others; sex; or rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori value—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation. **Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable in living—that is, pleasure itself**. And it seems equally **clear that we have a priori logical reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists**. Moreover, **we can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),**[[17]](http://cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/92/184#footnote-57591-17) **and only in living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.** However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than recognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objective value. For what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, **“life gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows life to have some (objective) value**. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.

#### Evolutionary biology makes sovereignty and realism inevitable

Thayer, 04

(Bradley Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of Minnesota, *Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict*, University of Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 75-76)

The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. **The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security**, **such as** striving to have a powerful military, **aggressing when forced** to do so, **and** forging and **maintaining alliances**. **This is** what neorealists call **a self-help system**: leaders of states arc forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that **evolutionary theory** also **offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior**. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. **The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from** other humans and **the environment were great**—so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high—without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift—survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. **This environment produced** the behaviors examined here: **egoism, domination, and the** in-group/out-**group distinction**. These specific traits arc **sufficient to explain why leaders will behave**, in the proper circumstances, **as offensive realists expect them to** behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family's or tribes need for food, shelter, or other resources).

#### Cap prevents global war

Bernstein, 02

(Andrew, Senior Writer for the Ayn Rand Institute and Ph.D. in Philosophy, “The Nobel Peace Prize Should Go to Those Who Really Support Peace”, October 11, <http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5453>)

If one admires men who cause war, one will ignore or vilify men who promote peace. Those who respect and support individual rights and political/economic freedom are the only true lovers of peace. Private capitalists and businessmen are outstanding examples. Business requires the barring of the initiation of force. Businessmen deal with one another peacefully, by means of trade, persuasion and voluntary contracts and agreements. Because businessmen respect the rights of all individuals, they have helped liberate the best minds to innovate, invent and advance, and thereby helped produce great general prosperity and peace. By helping to spread free trade across the globe, they have created peaceful relations among the individuals of many nations. Yet perversely, capitalists are denounced as exploiters of man. If we sincerely seek to attain the inestimable value that is world peace, it is individual rights and therefore capitalism that we must endorse. Capitalism is the only political-economic system that protects individual rights by banning the initiation of force. As Ayn Rand observed, it was capitalism that gave mankind its longest period of peace--an era in which there were no wars involving the entire civilized world--from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the outbreak of World War I in 1914. If we truly want to recognize and promote the cause of peace, let us award a peace prize to Capitalism.

#### War turns structural violence

**Bulloch 8** (Douglas Bulloch, IR Department, London School of Economics and Political Science.

 He is currently completing his PhD in International Relations at the London School of Economics, *Millennium - Journal of International Studies May 2008 vol. 36 no. 3 575-595)*

 But **the idea that poverty and peace are directly related presupposes that wealth inequalities are** – in and of themselves – **unjust, and that the solution to the problem of war is to alleviate** the injustice that inspires conflict, namely **poverty.** However, it also suggests that poverty is a legitimate inspiration for violence, otherwise there would be no reason to alleviate it in the interests of peace. It has become such a commonplace to suggest that poverty and conflict are linked that **it rarely suffers any examination**. To suggest **that war causes poverty** **is** to utter **an obvious truth,** **but** to suggest **the opposite is** – on reflection – **quite hard to believe.** **War is an expensive business** in the twenty-first century, **even asymmetrically.** And just to examine Bangladesh for a moment is enough at least to raise the question concerning the actual connection between peace and poverty. The government of Bangladesh is a threat only to itself, and despite 30 years of the Grameen Bank, Bangladesh remains in a state of incipient civil strife. So although Muhammad Yunus should be applauded for his work in demonstrating the efficacy of micro-credit strategies in a context of development, it is not at all clear that this has anything to do with resolving the social and political crisis in Bangladesh, nor is it clear that this has anything to do with resolving **the problem of peace and war** in our times. It does speak to the Western liberal mindset – as Geir Lundestad acknowledges – but then perhaps this exposes the extent to which **the Peace Prize itself has simply become** an award that reflects a degree of **Western liberal wish-fulfilment**. **It is** perhaps **comforting to believe that poverty causes violence,** **as it serves to endorse** a particular kind of concern for the developing world that in turn regards **all problems as fundamentally economic rather than deeply – and potentially radically – political.**

#### The criticism’s focus on the body creates a cult of exclusion that re-entrenches its impact

**Jarvis** **2K** [DSL, ‘International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism’, February, University of South Carolina Publishing, pg. 160-162]

Critical research agendas of this type, however, are not found easily in International Relations. **Critics of feminist perspectives run the risk of denouncement as** either **a misogynist** malcontent or an androcentric keeper of the gate. **At work** in much of this discourse **is a**n unstated **political correctness, where** the historical **marginalization of women bestows** intellectual **autonomy, excluding those outside** the identity **group from** legitimate **participation** in its discourse. Only feminist women can do real, legitimate, feminist theory since, in the mantra of identity politics, discourse must emanate from a positional (personal) ontology. **Those sensitive or sympathetic to the identity politics of par­ticular groups are**, of course, **welcome to lend support** and encourage­ment, **but only on terms delineated by the groups themselves.** In this way, **they enjoy an uncontested sovereign hegemony over their own self-identification**, insuring the group discourse is self constituted and that its parameters, operative methodology, *,uu\* standards of argument, appraisal, and evidentiary provisions are self defined. Thus, for example, when Sylvester calls lor a "home.steading" does so "by [a] repetitive feminist insistence that *we be included on our terms"* (my emphasis). Rather than an invitation to engage in dialogue, this is an ultimatum that a sovereign intellectual space be provided and insulated from critics who question the merits of identity-based political discourse. Instead, Sylvester calls upon International Relations to "share space, respect, and trust in a re-formed endeavor," but one otherwise proscribed as committed to demonstrating not only "that the secure homes constructed by IR's many debaters are chimerical," but, as a con­sequence, to ending International Relations and remaking it along lines grounded in feminist postmodernism.93 Such stipulative provisions might be likened to a form of negotiated sovereign territoriality where, as part of the settlement for the historically aggrieved, border incursions are to be allowed but may not be met with resistance or reciprocity. Demands for entry to the discipline are thus predicated on conditions that insure two sets of rules, cocooning postmodern feminist spaces from systematic analyses while "respecting" this discourse as it hastens about the project of deconstructing International Relations as a "male space." Sylvester's impassioned plea for tolerance and "emphatic cooperation" is thus confined to like-minded individuals, those who do not challenge feminist epistemologies but accept them as a necessary means of rein­venting the discipline as a discourse between postmodern identities—the most important of which is gender.94 Intolerance or misogyny thus become the ironic epithets attached to those who question the wisdom of this reinvention or the merits of the return of identity in international theory.'"' Most strategic of all, however, demands for entry to the disci­pline and calls for intellectual spaces betray a self-imposed, politically motivated marginality. After all, where are such calls issued from other than the discipline and the intellectual—and well established—spaces of feminist International Relations? Much like the strategies employed by male dissidents, then, feminist postmodernists too deflect as illegitimate any criticism that derives from skeptics whose vantage points are labeled privileged. And privilege is vari­ously interpreted historically, especially along lines of race, color, and sex where the denotations white and male, to name but two, serve as generational mediums to assess the injustices of past histories. **White males**, for example, **become generic signifiers for historical oppression**, indicating anontologicallv privileged group by which the historical experiences of the "other" can then be reclaimed in the context of their related oppression, exploitation, and exclusion. Legitimacy, in this context, can then be claimed in terms of one's group identity and the extent to which the history of that particular group has been "silenced." In this same way, self-identification or "self-situation" establishes one's credentials, allowing admittance to the group and legitimating the "authoritative" vantage point from which one speaks and writes. Thus, for example, Jan Jindy Pettman includes among the introductory pages to her most recent book, Worldinjj Women, a section titled "A (personal) politics of location," in which her identity as a woman, a feminist, and an academic, makes appar­ent her particular (marginal) identities and group loyalties.96 Similarly, Christine Sylvester, in the introduction to her book, insists, "It is impor­tant to provide a context for one's work in the often-denied politics of the personal." Accordingly, self-declaration reveals to the reader that she is a feminist, went to a Catholic girls school where she was schooled to "develop your brains and confess something called 'sins' to always male forever priests," and that these provide some pieces to her dynamic objec­tivity.97 Like territorial markers, self-identification permits entry to intel­lectual spaces whose sovereign authority is "policed" as much by marginal subjectivities as they allege of the oppressors who "police" the discourse of realism, or who are said to walk the corridors of the discipline insuring the replication of patriarchy, hierarchical agendas, and "malestream" theory. If Sylvester's version of **feminist postmodernism** is projected as tolerant, per-spectivist, and encompassing of a multiplicity of approaches, in reality it **is as** selective, **exclusionary**, and dismissive **of alternative perspectives as mainstream approaches are accused of being**.

#### No error rep—we can fix past mistakes

Jones and Smith, 11

(David Martin, Senior Lecturer, School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia, M.L.R., Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London, London, United Kingdom, “Terrorology and Methodology: A Reply to Dixit and Stump,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 34, issue 6, June//shree)

In our original review we particularly took issue with the belief, held by a number of contributors to Critical Studies on Terrorism, and reflected in British and Australian university programs, that conventional terrorism research deliberately conspires both to de-legitimize the critical voice and marginalize the non-Western “other.” In this regard, we found that critical theory engages in sweeping generalizations about the Western media presentation of terrorism and assumes or cherry picks facts to demonstrate political bias and a predetermined state conspiracy. Such a critical worldview again unconsciously mirrors the weakness of traditional terror studies during the Cold War, where writers like Claire Sterling in The Terror Network detected the hidden-hand of the Soviet Union behind every significant violent sub-state actor of the time. As we stated in our review, conventional and critical approaches often seem two sides of the same debased coin. More generally, the soi disant critical orientation of Critical Studies on Terrorism embraces the uncritical assumption that Western democracies have engaged in a conspiracy to demonize resistance by third world and particularly Muslim non-state actors. The critical approach thus places the assumption of the questionable and malign motivation of democratic governments (that nevertheless, and somewhat ironically, support the critical research agenda through the grant giving machinery) above conceptual precision and hypothesis testing. In the process, critical thinking problematically imports the paranoid outer reaches of the blogosphere into academia, thus legitimizing the conspiracies of hidden-hands, sinister schemes, malign forces, secret agendas, and controlling systems of power purveyed on websites like Spinwatch and Neocon Europe. In this context, Dixit and Stump's proposal to advance critical inquiry by “de-naturalizing the state” is less than helpful, not least because it merely reinforces the obsessive suspicion of the state that defines critical terrorology's worldview. In particular, Dixit and Stump's suggestion is based on the reductionist claim by Weldes, Laffey, Gusterson and Duvall that the whole field of “security studies” (an ill-defined subject area at the best of times) is predicated on immutable state threats. Consequently: Actors and their insecurities are naturalized in the sense that they are treated as facts that, because they are given by the nature of the interstate system, can be taken for granted. Taken as natural facts, states and other organized actors become the foundational objects the taken-for-granted of which serves to ground security studies.3 The proposed “de-naturalizing” of the state rests on this flimsy criticism of security studies, which raises more questions than it answers. What, we might ask, does “de-naturalizing” the state really mean? Taken to its logical conclusion it implies that we cannot discuss states as social facts. Nor can a de-naturalized perspective accept that the international system is primarily composed of states that express themselves through collective identities and interests and give material form to these through institutions and symbols that range from flags and anthems to national airlines and armed forces. From the constructivist ontology that Dixit and Stump embrace it appears that because there are no social facts that are not socially constituted there can be no such thing as facts at all. But if states cannot at a minimum be construed as social facts with histories and interests then how, we might wonder, can we begin to study their actions? In their subsequent discussion of terrorism as practice, the world Dixit and Stump inhabit is comprised purely of discourses and practices. Even a state's terror strategy, from this perspective, erroneously assumes an “objectively existing phenomenon.”4 Extending the process of de-naturalization, moreover, leads to some bizarre and nihilistic conclusions. The logic of constructivism would entail “de-naturalizing” not just the state, but all social arrangements, and any human organization, from nationalities, governments, and sub-state actors, to universities, academic journals, language and the constitution of the self itself. Ultimately, such “de-naturalization” undermines the foundations of social inquiry. All human institutions, from the state downwards, rest on assumptions and practices that are socially and historically constituted. All institutions and social structures can therefore be deconstructed.5 Fundamentally, there is nothing particularly novel about this insight that in fact began with the ancient Greek distinction between nomos and physis.6 Yet, if a program of inquiry simply regards constitutive processes as the only thing worth studying, then all phenomena collapse back into language, which robs everything, including constructivism itself, of meaning. As the Australian philosopher John Anderson observed of this style of thinking, it functions “as a substitute at once for philosophy and for a real theory of language.”7 The point is, as we argued in our review, that to achieve a genuine understanding we must either investigate the facts that are talked about or study the fact that they are talked about in a certain way. If we concentrate on the uses of language we are in danger of taking our discoveries about manners of speaking as answers to questions about what is there. This path leads not to any meaningful insight, but to the paradoxes of idealism Jorge Luis Borges explored in his Ficciones. In Borges's short story “Tln, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” the metaphysicians of the imaginary world of Tln (or the world conceived by constructivism) do not seek “for the truth, or even for verisimilitude,”8 which they consider devoid of interest, but instead pursue a “kind of amazement.”9 For, ultimately, if human agents are themselves, as Dale Copeland notes, merely “puppets of the ideational system in which they find themselves” then “each would exist as a socially conditioned 'Me', without the free-willed 'I' capable of resisting the socialization process.”10 Such a condition of linguistic mutability, in fact, undermines any transformative possibility for the international system, or indeed anything else. Yet, ironically, this is the very thing constructivists and critical theorists want to show is possible. Furthermore, if Dixit and Stump do not accept the logic of their constructivism, which abandons academic engagement for the path of Tlnist astonishment, then they must assert, somewhat arbitrarily, that we should de-naturalize the state, yet leave all other social institutions in their “natural” state. Such a method only frames the debate in a way that favors a set of ideological preferences, which inevitably prejudices the outcome of any inquiry by determining that all problems are the fault of the state and its insidious systems of exclusion. Dixit and Stump's proposed de-naturalization of the state, therefore, fails any adequate standard of hypothesis testing. Put simply, you cannot “de-naturalize” the one thing you might object to in the current political system, but leave all other practices and social arrangements, including the constitutive positions you occupy, naturalized as if you existed in Olympian detachment. As we pointed out in our review, at best this position is intellectually incoherent, and at worst hypocritical. We exemplified this point in our initial review with reference to Ken Booth's contradictory assertion that critical theorists must recognize that they inhabit a world constituted by powerful ideological systems, yet must themselves “stand outside” those systems.11 Such schemes repeat the Marxian fallacy of false consciousness, asserting that everyone, apart from the critically initiated, has their understanding distorted by the ideology in dominance. Critical theory apparently endows its disciples with the unique capacity to “stand outside” these systems of dominance and see through the othering processes of the state. Meanwhile, those trapped in the quotidian reality of the state have no access to this higher insight. Booth's article in Critical Studies on Terrorism shows where this style of thinking leads: to the conviction that the followers of critical theory alone can transcend the mundane and the political.